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Discipline and Discharge of
Public-Sector Employees: An
Empirical Study of Arbitration
Awards
Laura J. Cooper*
Commentators frequently assert that government employees
enjoy a level of protection from discharge far greater than private-
sector employees, and, indeed, that government employers are actu-
ally unable to fire public employees who perform poorly or engage in
misconduct. For example, author Mortimer B. Zuckerman maintained
in a 2010 US. News & World Report article that there were "two Amer-
icas" with a division that "affronts a sense of fairness" between the
protections afforded public-sector workers and those available to
workers in the private sector.' He stated, "it is almost impossible to
fire government workers except after a long process and only for the
most grievous offenses."2 A 2010 editorial in the Star Tribune newspa-
per concurred and went further to blame the phenomenon directly on
arbitration for "mak[ing] it difficult to terminate public employees."3
The newspaper's editorial continued, "[alrbitration is at the heart of
growing concerns about public employees' accountability. Many workers
are allowed to appeal disciplinary actions through this controversial
*J. Stewart & Mario Thomas McClendon Professor in Law and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, University of Minnesota Law School. Professor Cooper is also a labor arbi-
trator and member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. The data and analysis of
arbitration awards discussed in this article are derived from a book-length manuscript
prepared with co-authors Mario F. Bognanno, Professor Emeritus, University of Minne-
sota, Carlson School of Management; and Stephen F. Befort, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, &
Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The preliminary find-
ings of the study and a description of its methodology were previously published. Laura
J. Cooper, Mario F. Bognanno & Stephen F. Befort, How and Why LaborArbitrators Decide
Discipline and Discharge Cases: An Empirical Examination, in ARBrIRATION 2007: WORK-
PLACE JUSTICE FOR A CHANGING ENvinoNmEr, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SecrrlrH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS 420 (2008), http://naarb.
org/proceedings/index.asp. The project was funded by a grant from the Research and Edu-
cation Foundation of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
1. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Public Sector Profligacy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct.1, 2010, at 88.
2. Id. at 87.
3. Editorial, A Slap on the Wrist for St. Paul Workers: Reduced Suspensions Raise
Broader Accountability Questions, STAR TRIs., Sept. 14, 2010, http//www.startribune.
com/ opinion/editorials/102909709.html.
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process, which frequently upholds firings only in extreme cases or after
a lengthy record of unsuccessful efforts to improve performance."4
Are these assertions true? Do government workers enjoy job pro-
tections far beyond those of private-sector workers? Is it near impossi-
ble to discharge a public-sector worker for poor performance? Do labor
arbitrators uphold the discharge of public-sector workers only in ex-
treme cases? My co-authors and I have recently completed analysis of
the largest and most representative collection of discipline and dis-
charge decisions of labor arbitrators ever studied. From this database
we can test empirically these common assertions about public-sector
employee discipline and discharge and identify other characteristics of
public-sector employee discipline arbitration.
I. The Database
Our database was constructed from comprehensive coding of
2,055 published and unpublished arbitration awards in employee dis-
cipline and discharge cases rendered between 1982 and 2005. Eighty-
one arbitrators issued awards included in the database. This body of
awards was collected by the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services
(BMS) under a regulation which requires that all those on the agency's
roster of arbitrators submit to it all arbitration awards regarding Min-
nesota work sites, regardless of the source of appointment, unless a
private-sector party refuses to permit release of the award.5 We coded
every discipline and discharge award collected by the agency for that
time period. Our methodology for coding and analysis is more fully de-
scribed in an earlier publication.6
As the Minnesota public-sector workforce is heavily unionized,
this database provides an especially rich source of information regard-
ing arbitration of the discipline and discharge of government workers.
In 2005, the final year of arbitration awards analyzed for our study,
56% of public-sector employees in Minnesota were represented by a
union, compared to 9.9% of their private-sector counterparts. 7
4. Id.
5. Minnesota Rules, Chapter 5530.08, subpart 9, requires arbitrators to file their
public- and private-sector awards with the Commissioner of the Bureau of Mediation
Services. Specifically, the rule states: "Unless one or both private sector parties have spe-
cifically requested that an award not be provided to the commissioner, arbitrators shall
submit copies of all awards involving Minnesota work sites to the commissioner, regard-
less of the source of appointment or selection. Awards filed with the commissioner are
public documents." Id.
6. Laura J. Cooper, Mario F. Bognanno & Stephen F. Befort, How and Why Labor
Arbitrators Decide Discipline and Discharge Cases: An Empirical Examination, in ARBI-
TRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SixTI-
ErH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS 420
(2008), http://naarb.org/proceedings/index.asp.
7. Barry Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Data-
base from the CPS, http://www.unionstats.com (under "Union Membership, Coverage,
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Our database includes proportionately more public-sector than
private-sector arbitrations. Of the 2,055 awards, 1,218, or 59.27%, con-
cerned public-sector workers, and 837, or 40.73%, concerned private-
sector workers.8 Moreover, the proportion of public-sector awards rose
over the timespan of the study: public-sector awards represented
50.34% of awards from 1982 to 1989, 61.10% from 1990 to 1997, and
65.36% from 1998 to 2005.
II. Comparing Public- and Private-Sector Outcomes
Previous studies based exclusively on less representative pub-
lished awards have sought to test whether outcomes in discipline and
discharge cases varied depending on whether the worker was em-
ployed in the public or private sector. Several such studies found that
the sector variable produced insignificant differences in outcomes,9
while one study, by Debra Mesch, found that public-sector unions won
a larger percentage of their cases than did the private-sector unions. 10
Our database permitted us to re-examine the results of these research-
ers as well as to test the assertion of critics that it is more difficult to
discipline or discharge a worker in the public sector than in the pri-
vate sector. We were also able to differentiate results in discipline
cases from those in discharge cases.
The top panel of Table 1 shows that, with regard to non-discharge
disciplinary cases, arbitration outcomes were essentially the same re-
gardless of sector, with employers winning about 43% of discipline
cases in both sectors. However, in discharge cases, shown in the bottom
panel, outcomes in the public and private sectors were significantly
Density and Employment by State and Sector," follow "2005" hyperlink). Only eight
states had a higher percentage of unionized public-sector workers in 2005 (California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode
Island). Id.
8. The fact that our database includes a larger number of public-sector awards in
a state in which the numbers of unionized private- and public-sector employees is ap-
proximately equal suggests that our database may overrepresent public-sector awards.
This could occur because of the opportunity of private-sector parties to refuse inclusion
of their awards in the files of the Bureau of Mediation Services. See supra note 5. There
are also arbitrators hearing private-sector awards who need not submit them to the
BMS because they are not on its roster. On the other hand, the greater number of public-
sector awards may be the result of the greater likelihood of public-sector unions to arbi-
trate non-discharge cases, as shown in Table 1. See infra Table 1. Note also that our
coding of public-sector awards did not differentiate between the various levels of public-
sector employment, thus awards classified in our database as public sector include local,
state, and federal employees.
9. Nels E. Nelson & A.N.M. Meshquat Uddin, The Impact of Delay on Arbitrators'
Decisions in Discharge Cases, LAB. STuD. J. 3, 15 (Summer 1998); Perry A. Zirkel & Philip
H. Breslin, Correlates of Grievance Arbitration Awards, 24 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
45, 50 (1995).
10. Debra J. Mesch, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Conceptual Fra-
mework and Empirical Analysis of Public and Private Sector Arbitration Cases, 15 REv.
Pus. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 22, 30 (1995).
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Table 1: Arbitration Outcomes by Type of Discipline Imposed and Sector*
(N-size, row %, and column % are the top, middle, and bottom values, respectively)
Management Union Split Row
Sector Win Win Decision Totals
Discipline
Public 223 136 154 513
43.47a 26.51 30.02c 100.00
82.291 81.931 82.801 82.341
Private 48 30 32 110
43.64a 27.27 29.09 100.00
17.71 18.07 17.20 17.66
Column Totals 271 166 186 623
43.50a 26.65 29.86c 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Chi-square (2) = 0.0465, p = 0.977
Discharge
Public 396 116 193 705
56.171a 1 6 .4 5 1b 27.38c 100.00
52.73a 42.181 47.54 49.23
Private 355 159 213 727
48.83a 2 1 .87 b 29.30c 100.00
47.27a 57.82 52.46 50.77
Column Totals 751 275 406 1,432
52.44a 1 9 .2 0 b 28.35c 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Chi-square (2) = 9.6115, p = 0.008
*The numeric index 1 indicates that the percentages in row 1 and row 2 are statistically different at
the .05 level or lower. The alphabetic indexes a, b, and c indicate that the percentages in column 1
and column 2, column 2 and column 3, and column 3 and column 1, respectively, are statistically dif-
ferent at the .05 level or lower.
different. Both public- and private-sector employers won a signifi-
cantly larger percent of discharge cases than did their unions. In dis-
charge cases, public-sector employers prevailed in full in 56.17%
of cases, while private-sector employers prevailed in 48.83% of their
cases. Our data thus refute the assertion by critics of public-sector un-
ions that public-sector managers have particular difficulty prevailing
in arbitration cases, or that they are less successful than their counter-
parts in the private sector.
Table 1 clusters all discharge outcomes that are neither full man-
agement wins nor full union wins as "split decisions." We can provide
further detail on how those split decisions compare in the public and
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Table 2: Reinstatement Outcomes by Sector*
(N-size, row %, and column % are the top, middle, and bottom values, respectively)
Reinstatement Outcomes Public Sector Private Sector Row Totals
Uphold the Discharge 396 355 751
52.731 47.271 100.00
56.171a 48.83' 52.441
Reinstate-Full Backpay 119 164 283
42.05a 57.95 100.00
16.882a 22.562 19.762
Reinstate-Partial Backpay 75 74 149
50.34 49.66 100.00
10.643 10.183 10.413
Reinstate-No Backpay 109 131 240
45.42 54.58 100.00
15.464 18.024 16.764
Entitlement to Future Vacancy 6 3 9
66.67 33.33 100.00
0.855 0.416 0.635
Column Totals 705 727 1,432
49.23 50.77 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Chi-square (4) = 12.0821, p = .017
*The numeric indexes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicate that the percentages in row 1 and row 2, row 2 and
row 3, row 3 and row 4, row 4 and row 5, and row 5 and row 1, respectively, are statistically different
at the .05 level or lower. The alphabetic index a indicates that the percentages in column 1 and
column 2 are statistically different at the .05 level or lower.
private sectors. In Table 2, we see that reinstated public-sector em-
ployees are significantly less likely to receive full backpay (16.88%)
than reinstated private-sector employees (22.56%).
Our analysis also revealed that reinstated public-sector employ-
ees experience longer periods without pay than reinstated private-
sector employees. Government employees reinstated without backpay
lost pay for a mean of 195.96 work days (9.8 months), while reinstated
private-sector grievants lost pay for 154.50 days (7.7 months)-a sta-
tistically significant difference. A significant differential also occurred
in cases in which a discharge was reduced to a suspension. Public-
sector grievants had a mean period of suspension without pay of 60.45
days, while the average suspension period for reinstated private-sector
grievants was 50.55 days.
Returning to Table 1, we can also observe how much more fre-
quently public-sector unions arbitrate non-discharge disciplinary deci-
sions than do private-sector unions. More than 82% of the arbitrated
cases arising from reprimands and suspensions arose in the public sec-
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Table 3: Suspension Outcomes by Sector*
(N-size, row %, and column % are the top, middle, and bottom values, respectively)
Suspension Outcomes Public Sector Private Sector Row Totals
Suspension Upheld in 185 42 227
Full 81.50a 18.50 100.00
44.471 42.001 43.991
Suspension Reduced in 81 17 98
Length 82.65a 17.35 100.00
19.47 17.002 18.992
Suspension Overturned 97 26 123
in Full 78.86a 21.14 100.00
23.323 26.00 23.843
Suspension Reduced to a 53 15 68
Warning or Reprimand 77.94a 22.06 100.00
12.744 15.004 13.184
Column Totals 416 100 516
80.62a 19.38 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Chi-square (3) = 0.9269, p = 0.819
*The numeric indexes 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate that the percentages in row 1 and row 2, row 2 and row
3, row 3 and row 4, and row 4 and row 1, respectively, are statistically different at the .05 level or
lower. The alphabetic index a indicates that the percentages in column 1 and column 2 are statisti-
cally different at the .05 level or lower.
tor, while the frequency of discharge cases in the two sectors was
essentially equal." We can only speculate about why arbitration of
non-discharge decisions would occur more frequently in the public sec-
tor. One possibility is that public-sector union locals may be, on aver-
age, larger than private-sector unions and thus more able to assume
the financial costs of arbitrating cases of relatively minor discipline. It
may also be the case that reprimands and suspensions are more
worthy of challenge in the public sector because there such disciplin-
ary action may affect an employee's eligibility for increases under a
contract provision affording step increases in wage rates for employees
without disciplinary sanctions.
While we see significant differences between the public and pri-
vate sectors in the frequency with which non-discharge disciplinary
actions are brought to arbitration, we see in Table 3 that there were
no significant differences between the two sectors in the outcome of
arbitrated suspension cases. We also see in Table 3 that, in both the
11. While 80.62% of suspension cases in the database came from the public sector,
90.65% of the reprimand cases came from the public sector. It underscores the rarity of
the phenomenon to note that of 2,055 cases decided over a period of approximately
twenty-four years, there were only ten private-sector reprimand cases arbitrated.
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public and private sectors, arbitrators are more likely to uphold or
overturn a suspension completely, rather than to issue a split award in
which the suspension is either reduced in length or reduced to a warn-
ing or reprimand.
III. Employee Offenses in Public- and Private-Sector
Arbitrations
Critics of public-sector unions and of the procedures for discipline
of public-sector workers also claim that the grievance arbitration sys-
tem makes it virtually impossible to discharge government employees
for poor performance and that arbitrators will only uphold public-sector
employee terminations in cases in which the employee has engaged
in serious misconduct. We coded forty-three different offenses for which
employees were disciplined or discharged. Our database permits us
to examine the types of alleged conduct for which employees are disci-
plined, employers' likelihood of success in cases based on various
alleged employee offenses, and the extent to which the distribution of
employee offenses and success rates of employers for different offenses
varies between the public and private sectors.
Table 4 shows that two categories of offenses, unsatisfactory per-
formance and insubordination, each represented more than 10% of all
offenses arbitrated in both the public and private sectors. In both cate-
gories, the percentage of those cases was higher in the public sector.
The fact that unsatisfactory performance is the most frequently
arbitrated offense in the public sector makes evident that public-sector
employers are not reluctant to discipline or discharge government em-
ployees for poor performance. Table 4 also lists the three offense cate-
gories that yielded the most pronounced disparities between the public
Table 4: Comparison of Offenses Arbitrated in the Public and Private Sectors
(Discipline and Discharge)*
Public Sector Private Sector
Public Private
Sector Sector
Alleged Offense Cases CasesN (N=1,218) N (N=837)
Unsatisfactory performance 227 18.64a 101 12.07
Insubordination (contemporaneous) 191 15.68 112 13.38
Absenteeism 94 7.72a 163 19.47
Sexual harassment 87 7.14a 21 2.51
Off-duty misconduct 74 6.08a 13 1.55
*The alphabetic index a indicates that the percentages in column 2 and column 4 are statistically dif-
ferent at the .05 level or lower.
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and private sectors with regard to the offenses arbitrated: absentee-
ism; sexual harassment; and off-duty misconduct. Absenteeism was
more commonly arbitrated in the private sector, while sexual harass-
ment and off-duty misconduct arbitrations more frequently appeared
in the public sector. The greater potential for media exposure may
make public-sector employers more likely to discipline employees for
off-duty misconduct (such as drug use or other criminal offenses) and
sexual harassment. Employers may be less likely to settle these cases
for fear of a public backlash if they are perceived as failing appro-
priately to discipline employees thought guilty of these offenses.
Public-sector employers may be more likely to discipline employees for
off-duty misconduct because the nature of public-sector positions, such
as teacher and law enforcement officer, may more likely provide a
nexus with the off-duty misconduct so as to warrant discipline.
The following are the ten most common offenses found at issue in
public-sector discipline and discharge arbitrations, listed in order of
their frequency: unsatisfactory performance (18.64%); insubordination
(15.68%); failure to follow policy (excluding offenses listed separately
and reasonably contemporaneous insubordination) (9.69%); absentee-
ism (7.72%); verbal or physical abuse of students, patients, or inmates
(7.22%); sexual harassment (7.14%); negligence (6.49%); off-duty mis-
conduct (6.08%); lying (not on company records) (4.68%); and falsifying
company records (4.60%).
Table 5, in the Appendix, compares the extent to which case out-
comes for particular offenses vary depending upon whether the disci-
pline or discharge case arose in the public or private sector. For the
most part, it does not appear that there are meaningful differences in
case outcomes for particular offenses between the public and private
sectors, putting aside those offense categories in which one sector or
the other, or both, had fewer than five cases.
There were nine offense categories in which there were twenty-
five or more cases in both the public and the private sector. Comparing
employer win rates for those nine offenses yields four offenses in
which public-sector employers had the higher win rate (absenteeism,
falsifying company records, negligence, and failure to follow policy);
three offense categories for which private-sector employers had the
higher win rate (insubordination, lying, and theft from the employer);
and two categories in which the employer win rates were not signi-
ficantly different between the two sectors (alcohol offenses and un-
satisfactory performance). In only one of these nine offense categories,
negligence, was the difference in employer win rates greater than four
percentage points: Public-sector employers won 45.57% of negligence
cases while private-sector employers won only 38.64% of negligence
cases.
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We can also identify differences in public- and private-sector out-
comes for various offenses that were statistically significant. In three
offense categories public- and private-sector outcomes were different
at the .05 level of significance for all potential outcomes. For absentee-
ism, arbitrators in public-sector cases were more likely both to uphold
in full and to reduce the employer's disciplinary sanction than in
private-sector cases. However, the arbitrators in private-sector absen-
teeism cases were more likely fully to reject the employer's disciplin-
ary sanction and find no just cause for any discipline. For off-duty mis-
conduct, a much more common offense in public-sector arbitrations,
arbitrators were significantly more likely to uphold discipline imposed
by public-sector than by private-sector employers. The final offense
category with significant differences for all three outcomes is sexual
harassment. Here, arbitrators were significantly less likely fully to sus-
tain discipline by a public-sector employer than by a private-sector
employer. Public-sector employers may be less willing than private
employers to settle weaker sexual harassment cases prior to arbitration
in order to avoid public criticism for letting alleged harassers off too
lightly. Notice also that split decisions in sexual harassment cases oc-
curred much more often in the public sector than in the private sector.
IV. Teacher Termination Cases
Current public policy disputes about the relationship between
educational quality and teacher tenure laws make it relevant to ex-
plore how outcomes in teacher discharge cases compare to outcomes in
other discharge cases in the public sector. In our database of 705 dis-
charge cases in the public sector, forty-four cases came before arbitra-
tors, not under collective bargaining agreements, but pursuant to Min-
nesota statutes affording job security to teachers. These statutes
permit the termination of a tenured teacher for cause, with a showing
of more serious misconduct generally necessary to terminate a tea-
cher's contract prior to the conclusion of the school year.12
Comparing the overall win rate for employers in teacher termina-
tion cases in Table 6 (56.82%), with the overall win rate in all public-
sector discharge cases in Table 1 (56.17%), we see that employers' win
rates in teacher tenure cases were essentially identical to their success
in other public-sector discharge cases. Table 6 further indicates that
employer win rates in end-of-year and mid-year termination cases
were not significantly different from one another. Note, however, that
full employee wins were more prevalent in end-of-year terminations,
and reinstatement with reduced discipline was more prevalent in
cases of immediate discharge of a teacher. Arbitrators apparently
12. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2010); id. § 122A.40, subd. 13; id. § 122A.41,
subd. 6(a).
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Table 6: Outcomes in Teacher Termination Cases*
(N-size, row %, and column % are the top, middle, and bottom values, respectively)
End-of-Year Immediate
Outcomes Terminations Terminations Row Totals
Uphold the Discharge 18 7 25
72.00a 28.00 100.00
60.001 50.001 56.821
Reinstate-Full Backpay 8 1 9
88.892a 11.112 100.00
26.67 7.14 20.453
Reinstate-Partial Backpay 4 5 9
44.44 55.56 100.00
13.333 35.71 20.453
Reinstate-No Backpay 0 1 1
0.00 100.00 100.00
0.00 7.14 2.27
Entitlement to Future Vacancy 0 0 0
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00s 0.00s 0.006
Column Totals 30 14 44
68.18a 31.82 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Chi-square (3) = 6.4273, p = 0.093
*The numeric indexes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicate that the percentages in row 1 and row 2, row 2 and
row 3, row 3 and row 4, row 4 and row 5, and row 5 and row 1, respectively, are statistically different
at the .05 level or lower. The alphabetic index a indicates that the percentages in column 1 and col-
umn 2 are statistically different at the .05 level or lower.
found that the more egregious types of misconduct alleged in immedi-
ate discharge cases almost invariably warranted at least some level of
disciplinary sanction. The near-absence of arbitrators reinstating tea-
chers without any backpay is explained by statutory provisions that
maintain teachers' salaries pending the hearing decision in smaller
cities'3 and leave denial of pre-decision pay to the discretion of the
school board in the largest cities. 14
Although there were too few teacher termination cases to permit
a meaningful analysis of outcomes by offense categories, the three
most common offenses alleged in teacher termination cases were
offenses classified under the broad umbrella of "violence" (45.5%),
offenses classified generally as "insubordination" (34.1%), and unsatis-
13. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 13.
14. Id. § 122A.41, subd. 12.
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factory performance issues (25.0%).15 Interestingly, general performance
issues were at issue in five of twelve end-of-year terminations and six of
thirty-two immediate termination cases. Thus, although unsatisfactory
performance was not the largest category of reasons for teacher termina-
tion, as it was for public-sector terminations generally, performance was
a frequently disputed issue in teacher termination cases.
V. Summary
The analysis of the largest and most representative collection of
arbitrators' awards in discipline and discharge cases permits reaching
some at least preliminary conclusions about how the arbitration pro-
cess affects the job security of unionized government employees.
Non-discharge disciplinary sanctions including suspensions and repri-
mands are far more likely to reach arbitration in the public sector
than in the private sector. While case outcomes in non-discharge cases
are similar in the public and private sectors, public-sector employers
are more successful than private-sector employers in having their dis-
charge decisions upheld in full by arbitrators. When arbitrators issue
decisions reinstating an employee, public-sector employees are signifi-
cantly less likely than private-sector employees to receive full backpay.
Employees in the public sector reinstated with partial or no backpay
lose more weeks of pay than reinstated private-sector employees. The
most common reason for discipline or discharge among public-sector
employees in arbitration is unsatisfactory performance, followed by in-
subordination. Significantly more employees in the public sector are
disciplined or discharged for sexual harassment or off-duty miscon-
duct than in the private sector. Private-sector and public-sector case
outcomes can be compared with regard to forty-three different reasons
for employee discipline or discharge. Outcomes in teacher tenure cases
in which job protections were derived from statutes rather than from
collective bargaining agreements were comparable to outcomes in
other public-sector employee termination cases. Teachers in such
cases were more likely to have been terminated for serious misconduct
than for unsatisfactory performance, although unsatisfactory perfor-
mance was a common basis for teacher terminations.
15. This analysis is not based on the forty-three discrete offense categories re-
ported in Table 5, but rather on nine larger groupings of those forty-three categories.
Here, "violence" included Verbal or Physical Abuse of Customers, or Other Members of
the Public; Verbal or Physical Abuse of Students, Patients, or Inmates; Abusive Lan-
guage to Supervisor; Assault and Fighting Among Employees; Profane or Abusive Lan-
guage; Racial/Religious Slur; Sexual Harassment; Threat or Assault of Supervisor; and
Threat to Co-Worker. "Insubordination" included Insubordination; Refusal to Cross
Picket Line; Refusal to Accept Job Assignment; Refusal to Accept Overtime; and Failure
to Follow Policy.
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Appendix
Table 5: Alleged Discipline and Discharge Employee Offenses
by Outcome and Sector*
(N-size and row % are top and bottom values, respectively)
Just Just No Just
Cause for Cause for Cause for
Discipline Lesser Any Row
Alleged Offense Sector Imposed Discipline Discipline Totals
Absenteeism Public 49 29 16 94
52.131a 30.851 17.021c
Private 81 46 36 163
49.69a 28.22 22.09c
Verbal/physical abuse Public 27 10 6 43
of customers/members 62.791a 23.26 13.95c
of public Private 4 4 5 13
30.77 30.77 38.46
Verbal/physical abuse of Public 39 29 20 88
students/patients/inmates 44.321 32.951 13.95c
Private 5 8 8 21
23.81 38.10 38.10
Abusive language to Public 15 6 5 26
supervisor 57.69a 23.08 19.23c
Private 9 9 2 20
45.00 45.00b 10.OOC
Assault/fighting among Public 3 5 4 12
employees 25.001 41.67 33.33
Private 15 7 5 27
55.56 25.93 18.52c
Computer misuse (other Public 5 3 0 8
than obscenity/immoral 52.50 37.50 0.00C
conduct/pornography) Private 1 2 0 3
33.33 66.67 0.00
Property damage Public 10 4 3 17
58.82 23.531 17.65c
Private 9 10 7 26
34.62 38.46 26.92
Disloyalty to employer Public 8 3 3 14
(competition with 57.14 21.43 21.43
employer or conflict of Private 3 1 1 2
interest) 60.00 20.00 20.00
Discipline and Discharge of Public-Sector Employees
Alleged Offense
Distribution of drugs
Falsifring company
records (including time
and production records)
Falsifying employment
application
Gambling
Horseplay
Insubordination
(contemporaneous)
Leaving post (including
leaving work as a result
of a dispute)
Leaving work early
Lying (not on company
records or employment
application)
Misconduct during strike
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Sector
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Just
Cause for
Discipline
Imposed
2
100.00
0
0.00
31
55.36B
23
51.11a
7
87.50a
7
87.50a
1
100.00
0
0.00
0
0.001
5
55.56
82
42.93
51
45.54
7
33.33
8
42.11
4
44.441
9
52.94
26
45.61
18
47.37
0
0.00
0
0.00
Just
Cause for
Lesser
Discipline
0
0.00
0
0.00
17
30.36
9
20.00
1
12.50
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
2
100.00
3
33.33
71
37.17b
41
36.6lb
10
47.62
6
31.58
2
22.22
4
23.53
19
33.33
11
28.95
0
0.00
0
0.00
No Just
Cause for
Any
Discipline
0
0.00
0
0.00
8
14.29c
13
28.89
0
0.00c
1
12.50c
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
1
11.11
38
19.90C
20
17.86c
4
19.05
5
26.32
3
33.33
4
23.53
12
21.05c
9
23.68
0
0.00
1
100.00
Row
Totals
2
0
56
45
8
8
1
0
2
9
191
112
21
19
9
17
57
38
0
1
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Just Just No Just
Cause for Cause for Cause for
Discipline Lesser Any Row
Alleged Offense Sector Imposed Discipline Discipline Totals
Moonlighting (excluding Public 3 1 1 5
competition with 60.00 20.00 20.00
employer) Private 0 0 2 2
0.00 0.00 100.00
Negligence Public 36 32 11 79
45.57 40.51b 13.92c
Private 17 16 11 44
38.64 36.36 25.00
Obscene or immoral Public 5 6 0 11
conduct or pornography 45.45 54 .55 b 0.000
with a computer Private 0 1 0 1
0.00 100.00 0.00
Obscene or immoral Public 3 5 4 12
conduct or pornography 25.00 41.67 33.33
without a computer Private 4 1 0 5
80.00 20.00 0.OOC
Off-duty misconduct Public 38 16 20 74
51.351a 21.621 27.031c
Private 6 3 4 13
46.15 23.08 30.77c
Possession or use of Public 14 8 3 25
alcohol 56.00 32.00 12.00c
Private 14 5 6 25
56.00a 20.00 24.00
Possession or use of Public 20 6 2 28
drugs, positive drug test 71.43a 21.43 7.14c
result, or refusal to take Private 12 3 4 19
a drug test 63.16a 15.79 21.05c
Profane or abusive Public 22 11 9 42
language (towards 52.38a 26.19 21.43c
co-workers not including Private 7 12 4 23
supervisor) 30.43 52.17b 17.39
Prohibited strike Public 0 0 0 0
0.00 0.00 0.00
Private 1 0 0 1
100.00 0.00 0.00
Racial/religious slur Public 9 2 1 12
75.001a 16.67 8.33c
Private 0 0 0 0
0.00 0.00 0.00
Discipline and Discharge of Public-Sector Employees
Alleged Offense
Refusal to cross picket
line (usually that of
other union)
Refusal to accept job
assignment
Refusal to accept
overtime
Sexual harassment
Sleeping on job/loafing
Slowdown
Tardiness
Theft from co-worker
or customer
Theft from employer
Threat or assault of
supervisor
Sector
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private 9 4 0 13
69.23 3 0 .7 7 b 0.00,
209
Just
Cause for
Discipline
Imposed
0
0.00
0
0.00
2
66.67
2
66.67
1
100.00
1
16.67
35
40.231
10
47.62
12
60.00
11
52.38
1
50.00
0
0.00
12
54.55
14
63.64
7
58.33
7
58.33
26
50.98a
26
54.17a
7
50.00
Just
Cause for
Lesser
Discipline
0
0.00
0
0.00
1
33.33
2
33.33
0
0.00
2
33.33
31
35.631
10
47.62b
7
35.00b
8
38.10
1
50.00
0
0.00
6
27.27
7
31.82b
2
16.67
5
33.33
9
17.65
12
25.00
6
42.86
No Just
Cause for
Any
Discipline
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.001
4
0.00
0
0.001
3
50.00
21
24.141
1
4.761
1
5.00C
2
9.52c
1
0.00
1
100.00
4
18.18c
1
4.55c
3
25.00
3
25.00
16
31.37
10
20.83c
1
7.14c
7.14c
Row
Totals
0
0
3
8
1
6
87
21
20
21
2
1
22
22
12
15
51
48
14
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Just Just No Just
Cause for Cause for Cause for
Discipline Lesser Any Row
Alleged Offense Sector Imposed Discipline Discipline Totals
Threat to co-worker Public 8 6 1 15
53.331 40.00 6.67c
Private 13 4 4 21
61.90a 19.05 19.05C
Union activities Public 0 2 1 3
0.00 66.67 33.33
Private 0 0 2 2
0.00 0.00 100.00
Unsatisfactory Public 140 52 35 227
performance 61.671a 22.911 15.42c
Private 62 21 18 101
61.39a 20.79 17.82c
Other Public 3 4 5 12
25.00 33.33 41.67
Private 3 1 3 7
42.86 14.29 42.86
Failure to follow Public 52 40 26 118
other policy** 44.071 33.90 22.03c
Private 19 17 11 47
40.43 36.17 23.40
Column Totals* Public 772 465 287 1,524
50.66 30.51 18.83
Private 486 295 212 993
48.94 29.71 21.35
*The numeric index 1 indicates that the percentages in row 1 and row 2 within each offense category
are statistically different at the .05 level or lower. The alphabetic indexes a, b, and c indicate that the
percentages in column 1 and column 2, column 2 and column 3, and column 3 and column 1, respec-
tively, are statistically different at the .05 level or lower.
"This category included employee failure to follow a policy other than one identified by another spe-
cific category and excluded reasonably contemporaneous insubordination.
**Some cases involved more than one offense. The totals shown in the bottom row are the overall to-
tals for each possible outcome, disregarding the multiplicity of motivating offenses.
